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Introduction
RSA [2] is the most popular public-key cryptosystem in the world. Its security is based on the hardness of integer factorizatoin problem (IFP) . Let N, which is n-bit, be the product of two prime factors p and q, where p and q are unknown while N is public. Steinfeld and Zheng [4] called N as an α-LSBS modulus if p and q have α equal least-significant bits (LSBs), i.e. p − q = r · 2 α for some integer r. They showed that factoring an α-LSBS modulus requires the complexity in time polynomial in n if α ≥ n 4 . In this letter, we give an improved theorem to further reduce the lower bound of α. 
Proof of Theorem 1
First we define the functions MSB(·) and LSB(·). Given an integer x of m bits, whose binary representation is ( 2 , where x i = 0 or 1 for i = 1 ∼ m. Denote the notations "LSB i (x)" as the i-th LSB of binary string (x) 2 and "LSB i∼ j (x)" as the i-th to j-th LSBs of binary string (x) 2 , where i < j. That is, Similarily, denote the notations "MSB i (x)" as the (m+1−i)-th MSB of binary string (x) 2 and "MSB i∼ j (x)" as the (m + 1 − i)-th to (m + 1 − j)-th MSBs of binary string (x) 2 , where i < j. That is,
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the following lemma:
Thus, (2) implies (1), which shows the proof of Lemma 2.
Note that l is a solution to the modular quadratic congruence x 2 ≡ N (mod 2 α ), and it can be computed at most for 4 candidates in time polynomial O n 2 [4] . Moreover, if we replace p + q in (2) by (p H + q H ) 2 α + 2l, we get
After rearranging and simplifying (3) yields
which conducts to
By multiplying l −1 in Z 2 2α to both sides of (4) we have
Note that the integer 2 α in (5) implies that the 1 ∼ α least significant bits of (p H + q H ) 2 α are all zero. Therefore, ignoring the integer 2 α in the left-hand side of (5) conducts to 
and
By combining (6), (7) and (8), we get the formula:
Note that (9) is the same as Steinfeld and Zheng's result, described in part (2) of Lemma 2 in [4] . The difference is we conduct this formula with a simpler way. From (9), we know that p + q can be computed immediately if α ≥ n 4 . Here we show that this low bound of α can be further reduced by exploring MSBs of p + q. It is obvious that to explore MSBs of p + q is equivalent to estimate the value of p+q. One of the common methods is to use 2 √ N as the estimation of p+q. In [5] , Sun, Wu and Chen proposed a method, called EPF, to estimate p + q more accurately than 2 √ N. According to their results, the first 8 MSBs of p + q, i.e. MSB 1∼8 (p + q), can be completely determined by using EPF. Hence, for an α-LSBS modulus N, MSB 1∼8 (p + q) and LSB 1∼2α (p + q) are available for everyone. Note that since
the remaining unexplored part of p + q is LSB 2α+1∼n/2−7 (p + q) .
To search (10), it requires the time complexity at most O 2 (n/2−7)−(2α+1)+1 .
Assume that an exhaustive search for t bits is feasible in terms of current computational abilities, solving α for the equation
2 . Thus, we complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Discussion and Future Work
Theorem 1 also shows that the complexity of Fermat's factorization algorithm depends on the number of explored bits (MSBs and LSBs) of p + q. Note that in Fermat's algorithm p and q may not be prime numbers, but it doesn't affect the proof of Theorem 1 when applying to Fermat's factoring method. Furthermore, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3: Let N = pq denote an n-bit α-LSBS modulus. If there exists an algorithm A which, given N, can compute MSB 1∼m (p + q) in polynomial time, then Fermat's factorization algorithm can factor N in time complexity O 2 n/2−2α−m+1 .
The proof of Corollary 3 is quite easy and we omit it here. An interesting question is how to explore LSBs of p+q from the LSBs of N as many as possible to further reduce the lower bound of α. Moreover, this research also improves the security analysis for some cryptograpic applications, such as partial key exposure attacks on RSA [1] , server-aided RSA signatures [3] , small exponent RSA variants, [6] and so on.
